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# III. CRIMINAL AGGRESSION: BY WHOM COMMITTED?

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*"Whatsoever a man soweth that shall he also reap."*

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## AN INQUIRY

BY

EDWARD ATKINSON, LL.D., PH.D.,

BROOKLINE, MASS., FEBRUARY 22, 1899.

A SEQUEL TO

I. THE COST OF A NATIONAL CRIME.

II. THE HELL OF WAR AND ITS PENALTIES.

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FIRST EDITION, FIFTY-THREE COPIES.

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[Funds are wanted to pay for printing, stamping, and mailing future editions of this pamphlet III., at four dollars per hundred. Without postage it will be sent at two dollars per hundred by express.

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Remit to EDWARD ATKINSON, Box 112, Boston, Mass.]





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### III.

#### CRIMINAL AGGRESSION;

#### BY WHOM COMMITTED?

In November, 1898, a danger became dimly foreseen that this country might be committed to acts of criminal aggression which the President had denounced in April in his message to Congress giving the reasons why the oppressive rule of Spain should be removed by force from the Island of Cuba.

Many persons who had believed and who still believe that the rule of Spain could have been removed without resort to war, yet when war was declared gave their support to the Government and their approval to every measure deemed necessary to the conduct of the war.

A few distrusted the sincerity of the President and anticipated the evil events that have ensued. The writer was not then one of those who shared in the distrust of the Executive, although he feared the influence of those by whom he then believed and still believes the President had been forced to a premature and unseasonable exercise of force. Is there not sufficient proof of a combination organized for the purpose of criminal aggression which the President had denounced, but to which he has for the time submitted?

With the purpose of sustaining the President and to aid him in suppressing these malignant influences the writer prepared two treatises upon

- I. The Cost of a National Crime.
- II. The Hell of War and its Penalties.

When the forecast of a deficiency of \$150,000,000 in the next fiscal year was first published in November the estimate was received with derision by thoughtless persons. Many times the writer was asked why the revenues of the tropical islands falling into our possession on which Spain had battered should not suffice to sustain their government.

The venal yellow press not only derided this estimate, but attempted to discredit the writer by gibes and sneers which simply increased the contempt in which such papers are held.

How stands the case in February, 1899, four months later? The representatives of the Government in the House of Representatives now forecast a deficiency in the next fiscal year of much greater amount than the writer's guarded estimate, while the deficiency of the present year will exceed the estimate of the Secretary of the Treasury given in his annual report by at least forty per cent.

In order to sustain the President in avoiding criminal aggression, the writer also secured from abroad the ghastly evidence of the penalties of the Hell of War contained in the second treatise.

It is not a pleasant duty to prepare this third treatise showing how public trust has been betrayed and by whom. It will again invoke obloquy and abuse, but to any one who was bred in the time when resistance to the national crime of slavery brought out similar abuse, and even personal danger, these attacks but give support to the opponents of criminal aggression as they did fifty years ago to the agitation against slavery then represented by Garrison and Sumner, by Giddings of Ohio and Hale of New Hampshire, by John Quincy Adams of Massa-

chusetts, and by Seward of New York. These personal attacks are but evidence of the tribute that unscrupulous and depraved men have always paid to those who have defended the honor and integrity of the nation; this tribute was rendered to the men who redeemed it from the crime of slavery, so it will be to the men who hope and expect now to redeem it from criminal aggression.

It was assumed that President McKinley would avail himself of the opportunity given at the dinner of the Home Market Club to announce a positive policy. Yet we find in that speech but two positive statements.

The first is in the following words: "Every present obligation has been met and fulfilled in the expulsion of Spanish sovereignty from the islands."

The second declaration is in these terms: "No imperial designs lurk in the American mind. They are alien to American sentiment, thought, and purpose."

In these words the President adopts the principles of the Anti-Imperialist League and justifies all that has been done or said by that league. It becomes necessary, however, to review the rest of the speech. Respect for the office of President may not release the humblest citizens from the duty of bringing its incumbent before the bar of public opinion when he transgresses. Having been called upon to address a club of clergymen, I have recast my address to them in this treatise, No. 3, under the title, "Criminal Aggression, by Whom Committed?"

Gentlemen: I was very glad to receive the invitation to address members of the clergy in this emergency, for it seems to me that a duty has come upon the clergy of this country corresponding to that which led to the protest of the three thousand ministers against the crime of slavery a few years before the Civil War ensued in which slavery destroyed itself.

We are in an emergency to-day as serious as that which then threatened the life of this nation. The honor of this nation is now compromised by an aggressive war of forcible annexation under the lead of a President who attained the confidence of this country a short year since by declaring that he then spoke not "of forcible annexation, for that, by our code of morality, would be criminal aggression." Have we changed our code? If not, who is responsible for the criminal aggressions upon and the slaughter of the people of the Philippine islands by thousands?

I was reading last evening Trevelyan's "History of the American Revolution," and I came across this report. In one of the great debates of 1774 Stephen Fox, the brother of Charles James Fox, speaking of the condition of affairs in this country, said: "I rise, Sir, with an utter detestation and abhorrence of the present measures. We are either to treat the Americans (read, if you please, 'Filipinos') as subjects or as rebels. If we treat them as subjects the bill goes too far; if as rebels, it does not go far enough. We have refused to hear the parties in their defence, and we are going to destroy their charter (read deprive them of their rights) without knowing the constitution of their Government." Could a closer parallel be brought between the conditions of 1774 when we were the rebels and the conditions of the Filipinos to-day in their resistance to the effort to put a foreign rule upon them, in their refusal to be deprived of their rights, and in their objection to accept the gospel of peace at the point of the bayonet with the slaughter of thousands under the rapid-fire guns?

Now, I propose to deal with this question consecutively. We were driven prematurely into a war which may have been necessary for the removal of Spanish oppression from the Island of Cuba. It is useless now to discuss the question whether that war was necessary or not.



We entered into what one may at least declare was an unseasonable declaration of war before we were prepared and at the time when the utmost hazard of the tropical climate was upon us. But even if that war was inevitable does any one suppose that the war would have occurred had Lincoln been President, who resisted even the moral purpose of this country for two years until he knew the country would support him in emancipation? Does any one suppose that if he had been the President of the United States any men of the character and quality of the jingo Senators could have forced his hand? Does any one suppose that Grant would have submitted to such dictation? Does any one suppose that if Cleveland had been there, even though he himself had declared that it might become necessary to deal with Cuba by force, he would have allowed his hand to be forced by the venal pressure of the yellow press and its Senatorial emissaries to Cuba? Is it not our misfortune to have had in the chair of the President of the United States a man of weak and uncertain purpose without convictions and unequal to the emergency: who, having declared that an act of aggression would be a national crime, has trifled with the question? Did he not in his recent apologetic speech before the Home Market Club seek to find a way out of the evil conditions into which he has led the country by divesting himself of the responsibility and trying to throw it all on the Congress of the United States? I think it is time to speak and to speak plainly. William McKinley is the President of the United States. He was treated with respect in Boston as the President of the United States, but it was a great misfortune that even the members of the Home Market Club who utterly oppose expansion were under such obligation that none were able, owing to the courtesy of the occasion, to say one word in resistance to expansion or to the apparent policy of the President. Therefore the President may have returned under the impression that he is sustained in acts of criminal aggression here in Boston when we know that the moral sense of the community—the conscience of the community—is being aroused day by day against the policy which he represents.

Let us look a little into the history of this matter.

In a speech, Dec. 15, 1898, when the President was swinging around the circle, dealing with audiences from the rear end of a railway train and taking the shouts of the crowd as an indication of public sentiment, he reached Atlanta, and there he used these words:

“That flag has been planted in two hemispheres and there it remains, the symbol of liberty and law, of peace and progress. Who will withdraw from the people over whom it floats its protecting folds? Who will pull it down?”

If that is not a declaration of imperialism, what is it?

Who took down the flag in Mexico and gave back to the Mexicans the control of their own affairs after we had made conquest of their country? There is no such word in the President's speech to the Home Market Club. Since the date of the Atlanta speech he has had cause to change his tone. Under the brave lead of our Senator Hoar, supported by Senators Jones, of Arkansas, and Caffery, of Louisiana, and by many others too numerous to be named here, it has been made apparent that neither the common sense nor the conscience of this country will permit criminal aggression. We have failed in defeating cession under the treaty because there were many true men who are with the opponents of expansion absolutely, who thought it best that the treaty should be sustained in order that Spain might be divested of any further word to say on this matter. The opponents of imperialism, of expansion, and of criminal aggression who voted for the treaty joined with the opponents of the treaty are a majority of the present Senate; many of them feeling indignant because they have been forced

by the false conditions into which we had been brought by the President to accept the treaty. Though there are grave dangers growing out of the acceptance of the cession of the Philippines, they are not insurmountable, and when the will of the country is exerted, as it is now being manifested, the Executive will be compelled to take the country out of the false position in which we now are.

Now then, gentlemen, as to this speech of the President of the United States. Is it not an adroit rhetorical evasion of the pending question? Does it not show that he is still waiting to find out what will be popular rather than what will be right? Or what will control the future politics of this country rather than what will be for the true interest and honor of the nation? When before in the history of this country has a treaty been sent into the Senate of the United States by the President without a message giving the views of the Executive, or the grounds and reasons on which such a treaty should be sustained? Was not that evasion Number One? Or rather, was it not one evasion among many?

The President says: "Many who were impatient for the conflict a year ago, apparently heedless of its larger results, are the first to cry out against the far-reaching consequences of their own act." Against whom does he make that insinuation? Does he not attempt to put discredit, without naming them, upon Senators who voted unwillingly for war, unwillingly for the treaty, and who are now trying to avoid the evil consequences of the conditions in which he and his administration have put them?

Again the President says: "The evolution of events, which no man could control, has brought these problems upon us. Certain it is that they have not come through any fault on our own part." Had there been a man with any power of will to direct that evolution it would have been directed as human evolution may always be — by mental energy, in the right and not in the wrong direction. It is easy to quote evolution in evasion of duty; easy to talk about manifest destiny to cover a crime. It is the weak man who says "I couldn't help it."

Again the President says: "In its prosecution and conclusion the great majority of our countrymen of every section believed they were fighting in a just cause." This is true; they were fighting in the cause of liberty, and they had confidence in the declaration of the President that to let the war go beyond the restoration of liberty to an oppressed people would be an act of criminal aggression.

The President says: "The Philippines, like Cuba and Porto Rico, were intrusted to our hands by the war, and to that great trust, under the providence of God, and in the name of human progress and civilization, we are committed." Intrusted to our hands? By whom? How did we get possession of an area of about ten square miles or less which was all there was in the possession of Spain and which is all there is to-day in our possession? We secured it because the people trusted us. We found in the Philippine islands an organized army which had driven the Spaniards from every part of the islands except one or two cities where, through their navy, the Spaniards were enabled to sustain themselves. We called them to our aid, Admiral Dewey promoting the return of their chosen leader, Aguinaldo, to take the command and aid in the removal of the oppression of Spain from that little corner which was all that was not then in the possession of the inhabitants of those islands. That city of Manila and the territory within range of our guns have become "intrusted to our hands" with one city, Iloilo, since added. All the rest is intrusted to the inhabitants themselves. The Island of Luzon possesses large numbers of men of intelligence who have proven their capacity. It is under a constitution of which Senator Hoar says:



"There are not ten men on the planet who could have made one better." They have an organized army. They have rightfully supplied themselves with arms. Yet these people who trusted us have been slaughtered by thousands by American troops acting under the orders of President McKinley.

In apology and excuse for his previous course the President says: "Congress can declare war, but a higher power decrees its bounds and fixes its relations and responsibilities. The President can direct the movements of soldiers upon the field, and the fleets upon the sea, but he cannot foresee the close of such movements or prescribe their limits." Perhaps he could not prescribe the limits — the more reason to count the cost in blood and treasure. The very moment this war was entered upon I sent to Europe for the sick and death rates of the British armies in India, of the French army in the tropics, and of the Dutch army in their colonies. In the treatise on the Hell of War may be found the whole ghastly record to which for want of foresight we are about to expose the young men of this country unless we stop this national crime where it is. One example may here be given:

A few years ago France undertook the conquest of Madagascar, and to carry Christian civilization to the inhabitants at the point of the bayonet. They landed 12,800 troops, men from the army and navy, 2,000 of whom were in colonial regiments and were acclimated. Madagascar is a healthier island than Luzon, not as near the equator. In ten months 4,200 of these men died. The rest were so disabled that in one regiment, of which sixty per cent. died, not one single man reached the objective point. In Madagascar the French are now trying to maintain troops under a sick and death rate that they are afraid to have published even in their own country.

Again, witness the condition of the white troops in India. There were 70,000 British troops in India in 1896. In that year the admissions to hospital were nearly fourteen hundred men to each thousand on the average; that is to say, the whole force admitted once, nearly four hundred twice; the average term of each stay in hospital, thirty-five days. That average includes the health stations on the hills. There were 40,000 men on the plains, where it is hot and mostly dry. At some of these stations admission to hospitals ranged from 2,000 to 3,400 for every thousand men. The conditions in India are not nearly as bad as the malarious conditions in the Philippines described by Professor Worcester. In such hot climates, where every thought of morality and self-restraint is lost, 550 in every 1,000 in India, and in some stations 850 and 1,015, are infected with venereal diseases, of which the details are given in my treatise on the Hell of War. The accounts of the Surgeon-General of the United States have been demanded so that the people of this country may learn what the hell of war really is even when no shot or shell is fired.

I claim no more foresight than any other man of common sense, but when the danger of war was disclosed I sent for these documents and I have secured the printing of these details in a Senate document which Senator Lodge tried to stop on the ground of saving the expense of printing treatises by private persons. He was obliged to withdraw his objection when Senator Jones, of Arkansas, insisted on the record being made. You may contrast, if you please, the elements of politics and patriotism in the acts and speeches of the senior and the junior Senators of Massachusetts. Choose then who honors and who dishonors the State.

Again the President says: "We cannot anticipate or avoid the consequences, but we must meet them." No, President McKinley was neither capable of foreseeing or avoiding the consequences of his act. He now declares himself to be incapable of meeting the consequences, and attempts to throw the whole burden upon the Congress of the United States.

Again he says: "There was but one alternative, and that was either Spain or the United States in the Philippines." Was there no other alternative? If there was no other why did Admiral Dewey bring Aguinaldo back to take the lead of the Filipinos? Why did he accept the aid of the organized forces which have now invested our army in Manila as it invested it when we were engaged in removing the oppressive forces of Spain from there? Did not Admiral Dewey foresee the need of a land force to coöperate with the navy in removing the oppression of Spain when he promoted the return of Aguinaldo to Manila to command that force? Who is yet entitled to pass judgment upon Aguinaldo? Our own officials have promoted his movements and perhaps unwisely made promises of support. What if he should prove to be a born leader of men? Who will then be shamed? When shall we know the truth in this matter? When will the evidence of United States Consul-General Pratt, of Singapore, and of Consul Wildman on this matter be laid before Congress? We have as yet but indirect evidence of their interviews with Aguinaldo. What purports to be an authentic statement published by a friend and correspondent of Consul-General Pratt in Birmingham, Ala., is as follows:

"Alluding to the first conference, the writer says: 'There were present General Emilio Aguinaldo y Femi; E. Spencer Pratt, Consul-General of the United States; Howard H. Bray; J. Leyba, Aguinaldo's private secretary; Colonel Marcelo del Pilar; and M. Santos.'

"During the conference, at which Bray acted as interpreter, Aguinaldo explained to Consul-General Pratt incidents and objects of the late rebellion, and described the then disturbed state of the country. He then proceeded to detail the nature of the coöperation he would give, in which he, in the event of the American forces from the squadron landing and taking possession of Manila, would guarantee to maintain order and discipline among the native troops and inhabitants in the same humane way in which he had hitherto conducted war, and prevent them from committing outrages on defenceless Spaniards beyond the inevitable in fair and honorable war.

"He further declared his ability to establish a proper and responsible government on liberal principles, and would be willing to accept the same terms for the country as the United States intended giving Cuba. The Consul-General of the United States, coinciding with the general views expressed during the discussion, placed himself at once in telegraphic communication with Admiral Dewey at Hong Kong. As a result, another private interview was arranged at the American consular residence, between Aguinaldo, Pratt, Bray, and Leyba. As a sequel to this interview, and in response to the urgent request of Admiral Dewey, Aguinaldo left Singapore at once for Hong Kong, and accompanied Dewey with the fleet to Manila.

"General Aguinaldo's policy, as clearly stated in his interviews at Singapore, embraced the independence of the Philippines. American protection would be desirable temporarily, on the same lines as that which might thereafter be instituted in Cuba. The ports of the Philippines would be free to the trade of the world, safeguards being enacted against an influx of Chinese aliens who would compete with the industrious population of the country. The entire freedom of the press would be established, as well as of thought and public meetings. There would be general religious toleration, and steps would be taken for the expulsion of the religious fraternities who had a strong hand on every branch of the civil administration.

"These promises were made, as stated, in the interviews with Consul-General Pratt at Singapore, telegraphed to Dewey at Hong Kong only a few days before

the fleet sailed, and Aguinaldo accompanied the fleet at Dewey's urgent request on receipt of Pratt's telegrams. Subsequent events proved that Aguinaldo kept all of his promises, but the interesting feature of this incident is that no official announcements or publications of the facts have emanated from the Government at Washington."

The President says: "The second alternative was that they be left to the anarchy and chaos of no protectorate at all." The common sense of this country will reject that statement. There existed a protectorate capable of protecting persons and property. Under that protectorate the Philippine forces held Iloilo, where they committed no looting, no interference with persons or property, no meddling with the foreigners. There they maintained their rights until we attacked them, and then they retired.

By whom was this attack authorized? What induced the Filipinos to resist the forces of the United States? Who began that fight? As yet we have no evidence. Who is responsible? Aguinaldo says: "The President of the United States is responsible," and I think he goes far to prove it. What order did the President of the United States utter December 27 before the treaty had been ratified, either by the United States or Spain, without authority of law, usurping power not then vested in him? He ordered General Otis to take possession of the Philippine islands. He says: "The actual occupation and administration of the entire group of the Philippine islands becomes immediately necessary and a military government heretofore maintained in the United States, in the city, harbor, and bay of Manila and the whole of the ceded territory." Mark the words, "the whole of the ceded territory" from which Spain had already been expelled by the Filipinos themselves, with the exception of ports under the control of the Spanish navy. The advocates of expansion and of continuous possession assume that there are no Filipinos who have a sense of their own rights or any power to maintain them. What says your coadjutor, Rev. Clay MacCanley, on this matter? Is he a competent witness? Visiting these islands with a feeling bred of the missionary spirit that it was our duty to retain them, he found evidence on the spot which wholly change his opinion. He says:

"It should be known, to begin with, that the people of the Philippines are opposed to such annexation. By the Philippine 'people' I do not mean the savage tribes of the hills of Luzon and of the remote islands. These tribes have always ignored or antagonized every other than their own inherited governments. They would, for an indefinite time, be as hostile to the rule of the United States as the North American Indians ever were. Constantly recurring conflicts with them would await us in our government of the islands, even were all other sources of opposition removed. The Philippine 'people' are the hundreds of thousands of Christianized natives and persons of half or mixed caste who now occupy numerous cities, towns, and plantations; who possess accumulated wealth; conduct agriculture, own factories, and direct foreign commerce; and who have attained to a considerable degree of education and culture in the arts and in the learned professions. These people have developed in large measure a political consciousness and ambition, and are now represented in the 'Philippine Republic.' The proposed assumption of political sovereignty over them by the United States has recently become magnified to them as their greatest danger. By common impulse they are throughout united to oppose it, and unless their fear can be quieted, or their allegiance to American sovereignty secured by persuasion or reward, they will carry their opposition into open warfare. Above all, they demand that the Government that directs their affairs shall have place through their own consent. They resent the agreements of Spain and the United States, or the acts of the

American Congress, that dispose of them politically like so many pieces of chattel property. They claim to have now an established and systematized government, self chosen; and evidently they have a large and well-armed army gathered to defend what they claim to be their freedom and independence. I have been informed on good authority that more than eighty thousand rifles have been imported by the Philippine insurgents during the past few months. Whatever might be done to win the Filipinos from allegiance to their 'republic,' certain it is that an arbitrary act of annexation now would only arouse them to a struggle for freedom and national autonomy."

Edifying spectacle it would be, that of this new republic of the far East striving to the death to defend itself from a greed of conquest satiating itself upon it in the old republic of the West, "the land of the free and the home of the brave."

"And next, the people of the United States should know that their fellow-citizens now in the Philippines, the soldiers and sailors of the American army and navy there, are generally opposed to or indifferent to the proposed annexation. With the most intelligent and thoughtful among them, antagonism is supported by judgment drawn from many considerations, some of which are here summarized. Surely it is worth the attention of the people at home who are willing to commit our Government to an attempt at the annexation of the Philippine islands, the fact that most of their fellow-citizens who have for months been dwellers in the islands, in contact with the native people there, and who have learned much of the various conditions there, — physical, social, and commercial, — should have grown increasingly opposed to the proposition to incorporate the Philippine people into the American body politic."

Aguinaldo has uttered a protest. He gives the reason why the confidence of the Filipinos was destroyed by this unwarranted and unlawful order of the President of the United States before the treaty had been accepted, to take possession and administer the whole islands. Now, let any American put himself in the place of an intelligent citizen of the Island of Luzon, what would be his conception of such an assumption of power over him backed by military force? Would he not protest? Witness the simple dignity of Aguinaldo's words:

"I solemnly protest in the name of God, the root and fountain of all justice and of all right, and who has given to me the power to direct my dear brothers in the difficult work of regeneration, against this intrusion of the Government of the United States in the sovereignty of the islands. Equally I protest in the name of the Philippine people against this intrusion, because when they gave me their vote of confidence, electing me, though unworthy, as President of the nation, when they did this they imposed on me the duty to sustain to death their liberty and independence."

That is the answer of the man whom Admiral Dewey found fit to place where he could assume the responsibility with which he is charged, and on whichever side the first shot was fired in the slaughter of these people the sole responsibility for this act of criminal aggression rests upon the President of the United States.

Yet the President says: "The treaty gave them to the United States. Could we have required less and done our duty? Could we, after freeing the Filipinos from the dominion of Spain, have left them without Government and without power to protect life and property, or to perform the international obligations essential to an independent State?" This question rests on false premises. They had a government. They had power to protect property. They have the power to enter into international relations, and they may yet be recognized and rightly recognized by other powers.



The President says in speaking of other nations: "Did we ask their consent to liberate them from Spanish sovereignty or to enter Manila bay and destroy the Spanish sea power there? We did not ask these; we were obeying a higher moral obligation which rested on us, and which did not require anybody's consent. We were doing our duty by them with the consent of our own consciences and with the approval of civilization." Are we now doing our duty by them by slaughtering them by the thousands, and by burning and shelling their villages without giving the women and children a chance to escape? What sort of a conscience warrants such acts — what civilized man approves?

But witness the inconsistency in this speech. The President says: "Every present obligation has been met and fulfilled in the expulsion of Spanish sovereignty from their islands." True, and nearly the only simple and plain statement of a fact to be found in the whole speech. Then why not withdraw? "During the progress of the war with Spain we could not ask their views. Nor can we now ask their consent." Why not? Are not the people of the Island of Luzon entitled to be consulted? Are they to be governed by military force under an arbitrary order from a foreign ruler? They have an established form of government. They have presented state papers of unequalled excellence and force which have been refused by the State Department, and rejected in terms of contempt by the military officers of the United States.

The President says in excuse or palliation of this offence: "It is not a good time for the liberator to submit important questions concerning liberty and government to the liberated while they are engaged in shooting down their rescuers." Surely it may not be a good time to deal with them when they are being liberated by death and when our forces are rescuing them with repeating rifles, but why were these important questions not submitted to them before the President on his own authority asserted an unlawful dominion over them?

The President having brought this shame upon us; having said that the flag should not come down; having asserted possession before the cession from Spain had been accepted by the Senate and before he had any rightful authority, thus inciting the Filipinos to resistance, now declares: "I do not intend to obtrude upon the duties of Congress or seek to anticipate or forestall its action. I only say that the treaty of peace, honorably secured, having been ratified by the United States, and, as we confidently expect, shortly to be ratified in Spain, Congress will have the power, and I am sure the purpose, to do what in good morals is right and just and humane for these peoples in distant seas." Having found himself incapable of meeting the duties and responsibilities of his position, he is now shifting upon Congress the dreadful penalties of his own incapacity. Again: "Until the treaty was ratified or rejected the Executive Department of this Government could only preserve the peace and protect life and property. That treaty now commits the free and enfranchised Filipinos to the guiding hand and the liberalizing influences, the generous sympathies, the uplifting education, not of their American masters, but of their American emancipators."

Why did he assert dominion before the treaty was ratified? Why oppress in the name of enfranchisement?

Enfranchised, indeed, under the guiding hand and liberalizing influences of repeating rifles, the uplifting education of dynamite guns, turned against them by armed forces ordered to govern them without their consent.

Again the President says: "I know no one at this hour who is wise enough or sufficiently informed to determine what form of government will best subserve their interests and our interests, their and our well-being," thus admitting incapacity.



He goes on to declare : " Until Congress shall direct otherwise it will be the duty of the Executive to possess and hold the Philippines " (we hold ten miles square, or less, from a part of which we have retreated), " giving to the people thereof peace and order, and beneficent government, affording them every opportunity to prosecute their lawful pursuits, encouraging them in thrift and industry, making them feel and know that we are their friends, not their enemies, that their good is our aim, that their welfare is our welfare, but that neither their aspirations nor ours can be realized until our authority is acknowledged and unquestioned."

If it were not for the atrocities which have been committed in the name of duty, peace, and order, there would be something grotesque in the absurdity of such platitudes spoken by the President before the reverberation of the guns discharged in the slaughter of the Filipinos have ceased to echo around the world to the dishonor of this country.

But still we will welcome the President to the ranks of the Anti-Imperialist League if we can trust his words : " No imperial designs lurk in the American mind. They are alien to American sentiment, thought, and purpose. Our priceless principles undergo no change under a tropical sun. They go with the flag. If in the years of the future they are established in government under law and liberty, who will regret our perils and sacrifices ? " But if these people are now in the present established in law and capable of maintaining liberty, as they have proved themselves to be, who will not regret the slaughter which we have inflicted upon them ? Will not the mothers of the land regret the loss of their sons, now on the way to or now in Manila, only beginning to be exposed to worse dangers than the resistance of the Filipinos under the ghastly conditions of the worst of tropical climates in the rainy season ? In an aggressive campaign away from the sea we may fear that of the 25,000 men who have been despatched to Manila, if kept there three or four months longer, not one-half will ever see their native land again ; we may fear that nearly all of the other half who may return will come back impaired in health and strength. The evidence of these dangers is conclusive. The facts disclosed by the records of the British, French, and Dutch armies almost prove that such will be the fate that we are bringing upon the children of Americans. I know no men whose names will go down among the mothers of the land, even in the near future, subject to greater execration than the names of the men who have brought this act of criminal aggression upon the nation.

Professor Worcester states the only conditions under which white men may be able to retain their health and strength in the Philippine islands in the following terms : " Briefly stated the facts are as follows : If one is permanently situated in a good locality where he can secure suitable food and good drinking water ; if he is scrupulously careful as to his diet, avoids excesses of all kinds, keeps out of the sun in the middle of the day, and refrains from severe and long continued physical exertion, he is likely to remain well, always supposing that he is fortunate enough to escape malarial infection."

If the regular army of the United States is stationed in the Philippine islands or in Cuba, and kept there six months, it is practically certain that after that term has elapsed there will be no regular army of the United States in existence capable of any effectual service even on the part of the survivors. When the facts become known voluntary enlistments will cease, and the act of criminal aggression can only be continued by a forced enlistment under a draft.

Let there be no misapprehension in this matter. We can extend our admiration to our army and navy ; to the privates and most of the officers of our army and to the officers of the navy as well as the privates. War has not ceased

among men and how soon it will cease none can tell. Even President Cleveland thought it might become necessary to make forceful intervention in the Island of Cuba. When the war was prematurely entered upon it found our navy governed by the civil-service rules, thoroughly well organized, the right men in the right places and no power or influence of any Representative or Senator capable of moving the authorities of the navy, or of putting men in their places unqualified for the positions.

At the Navy Department there were no Senators or Representatives in the lobby, no seekers for place and position around the doors. Everything was done with effective energy, and the work of the navy bears witness to the civil-service rules by which it has been governed. But when we give regard to the War Department, there the lobbies were filled; there political influence was paramount. There men who were wanted to take important places in the Commissary Department, fully qualified, were rejected, and incapable persons put in at the instance of politicians. And what did we get? We brought together an army under conditions which rendered it almost incapable of effective service. One of the members of the Commission on the conduct of the war said to me that the conditions at Tampa were almost those of a mob without head or leader. In some way the line officers got the troops over the sea. There they blundered into a direct attack upon Santiago, where the bravery of the troops and the incapacity of the enemy saved them from a great disaster. Men who knew the conditions allege that had the officers in command been willing to wait for the coöperation of the navy there was an easy place to land a few miles away, free of fortification, from which a railway leads, by which all our troops could have moved to the rear of the Santiago forts where, under the protection of the navy, the defences could have been turned, and a large part of the risk might have been avoided.

Although giving credit to the Navy Department and its chief, when I read the following paragraph closing the speech of the Secretary in support of the action of his chief: "Is not that the statesmanship of the great Master who limited not His mission or that of His disciples to His own chosen people, but proclaimed that His gospel should be preached in all the world unto all nations, that greatest Statesman of all time, Jesus Christ," it seemed to me blasphemy to cite the authority of Jesus Christ in justification of the slaughter of the Filipinos. I can conceive of nothing more sacrilegious than that citation. When I was speaking the other night to the chiefs of the labor organizations who are moved most deeply in this matter I said, If that is Christianity you may call me Infidel or call me Pagan, but it is not; it is servile adulation in profane terms.

The advocates of aggressive expansion tell us that we have no alternative, but when our alternative is presented he who presents it is called a visionary. There is an alternative and everything is propitious for its adoption. The effort has been made by the jingoes to get up public demand for maintaining possession or annexing these islands by alleging danger of seizure by Germany or France. They do not dare to impute such purpose to Great Britain. Any such intention has been repudiated by the Ministry of Germany. It is denied by our ambassador, Andrew D. White, and it is a false imputation made for an evil purpose. France is struggling to surmount the cost of lives and money in the tropical colonies now held, and wants no more.

What, then, are the facts about the Philippine islands. No one wants them. No one wants to assume the expense, danger, and cost of subduing and governing them. But no one nation wants the other to make a base of offence against any other nation. Then why not neutralize them? We can lend the Filipinos men like Sir Robert Hart of England, or my former townsman, E. B. Drew, who was formerly a high-school teacher in Brookline. These two men are now adminis-

tering the customs of China. Lord Cromer administers the affairs of Egypt under the Khedive. The Philippines may be neutralized as Belgium is neutralized; as Switzerland is neutralized; as the Congo Free State is neutralized. Is not everything propitious? President McKinley has the opportunity to make himself a record in history as the great man of the century could he comprehend his true mission and take advantage of the existing conditions. All nations to have their coaling stations; all nations to land their cables; all to have equal rights and no hostile shots to be fired upon the land, and no contest upon the waters thereof.

We can make the Philippine islands the sanctuary of commerce; we can aid the inhabitants to bring order out of chaos; we can help them work out their own national salvation; and joined with the Czar we can take the first measures for abating the hell of war upon the earth.

"Can these things come to pass?  
Nay, if it be, alas, a vision!  
Still let us sleep and dream it true;  
Or, sane and broad awake,  
For its great sound and sake  
Take it and make it earth's,  
And peace ensue."

I have remarked that whenever right-minded men make an effort to establish peace upon earth and good-will among nations those who are imbued with the military spirit or with the survival of the brute element in man cry, Visionary! These are the men who to-day, on this twenty-second of February, the birthday of Washington, are trying to put him in contempt by casting ridicule on his farewell address as having no relation to present times. Was he not a soldier? Did he not fight to redeem his countrymen from oppression, and did he not show when the conflict was ended that in him there was no survival of the brute element, which actuates many of the advocates of expansion? Did he not declare and enforce the principles of peace? It is not only expansion, but militarism that is upon us, but that evil once recognized has already been suppressed. The rising tide of popular opinion among workingmen, among farmers, among clergymen, and among all thoughtful men who can rightfully claim to be good citizens, will resist criminal aggression and will yet compel the Congress and the Executive of the nation to remedy the wrongs which have been inflicted upon these people. Then will be found the easy way to do right; then the present Executive may open that way by neutralizing the Philippine islands and making them the sanctuary of commerce. The opponents of criminal aggression will then join in saving the President from the execration which may rest upon him and his supporters when the death rate in our army in the tropics begins to be recorded, unless this great wrong is quickly righted. If that right way is taken then the name of William McKinley may yet go down in history, when all the evils of the present have been buried in the remote past, among the great names of the benefactors of the world.

I have thus endeavored to put before you, members of the clergy, a full and frank statement of our present conditions, without fear or favor. When the opponents of expansion first entered upon the work they seemed to be few. Many now active and earnestly working with us then seemed to fear that the nation had been so far committed that there was no way out. All that has changed. Congress has refused to warrant a permanently large standing army, and is beginning to feel the influence of the sober second thought of the people giving them a warning no longer to commit criminal aggression. We now call upon the clergy to join in this righteous cause, and to aid us with their earnest work.

EDWARD ATKINSON.

## APPENDIX.

In order to support the statements submitted in the foregoing treatise by adequate proofs I have endeavored to get a copy of Senate Document No. 62, containing the evidence and information submitted by the President with the treaty of peace, — a document of five hundred pages. But having as yet failed to secure a copy, I may rightly make citations from this document which were submitted by Hon. Henry U. Johnson and by Hon. Rice A. Pierce in their speeches in the House of Representatives.

In support of the right of the Filipinos to self-government Mr. Johnson said, "Are you aware that Admiral Dewey made use of this language in his communication to the Secretary of the Navy on the 29th of last August? —

"The population of Luzon is reported to be something over 3,000,000, mostly natives. These are gentle, docile, and, under just laws and with the benefits of popular education, would soon make good citizens.

"In a telegram sent to the department June 23 I expressed the opinion that these people are far superior in their intelligence, and more capable of self-government, than the natives of Cuba, and I am familiar with both races. Further intercourse with them has confirmed me in this opinion."

MR. JOHNSON —

Has it escaped your notice that the United States Consul-General at Hong Kong, China, made use of the following language in his communication to Mr. Moore of the Department of State? —

I consider the forty or fifty Philippine leaders, with whose fortunes I have been very closely connected, both the superiors of the Malays and the Cubans. Aguinaldo, Agoncilla, and Sandico are all men who would all be leaders in their separate departments in any country.

In conclusion I wish to put myself on record as stating that the insurgent government of the Philippine islands cannot be dealt with as though they were North American Indians, willing to be moved from one reservation to another at the whim of their masters. If the United States decides not to retain the Philippine islands its 10,000,000 people will demand independence, and the attempt of any foreign nation to obtain territory or coaling stations will be resisted with the same spirit with which they fought the Spaniards.

In the very able speech of Hon. Rice A. Pierce many citations are given. He said, "And now we come to the consideration of the permanent holding of the Philippine islands, to do which General Whittier, in his testimony before the Paris Commission, said:

"If we attempt the unwise thing of ignoring the natives an army of 50,000 men will be none too small. — Senate Doc., No. 62, part 1, page 508."

In reply to the charge that Señor Aguinaldo had been bribed by Spain to leave the islands and had appropriated the money Mr. Pierce refers to the fact that on the 24th day of May, 1898, Mr. Oscar F. Williams, United States Consul to Manila, telegraphed to the Secretary of State, as follows:

To-day I executed a power of attorney whereby Aguinaldo releases to his attorneys, in fact \$400,000 now in bank in Hong Kong, so that the money can pay for 3,000 stands of arms bought there and expected here to-morrow.

Again Mr. Pierce recites from Document 62:

On the 4th of July, 1898, Gen. Thomas M. Anderson, commanding the United States troops at Cavite, addressed a letter to Señor Don Emilio Aguinaldo, commanding the Philippine forces at the same place, in which he said (page 390):

GENERAL: I have the honor to inform you that the United States of America, whose land forces I have the honor to command in this vicinity, being at war with the kingdom of Spain, has entire sympathy and most friendly sentiments for the native people of the Philippine islands.



For these reasons I desire to have most amicable relations with you, and to have you and your people coöperate with us in the military operations against the Spanish forces.

To this Aguinaldo made an earnest and instant response, which was acknowledged by General Anderson in a note dated July 6, in which, after informing Aguinaldo that large reinforcements were expected from the United States, for whom more space would be required for camps and storehouses, he said (page 391):

For this I would like to have your Excellency's advice and coöperation, as you are best acquainted with the resources of this country.

He added that they did not intend to remain inactive, but to move promptly "against our common enemy."

Referring to the Spaniards' fear of the Filipinos, General Whittier said (page 491):

I think the Captain-General was much frightened. He reported in great trepidation that the insurgents were coming into the city, and I said that I knew that that was impossible, because such precautions had been taken as rendered it so.

General Whittier said, in answer to a question put by Senator Gray (page 492):

They are somewhat undersized, are fairly good in appearance, are brave, will stand any amount of hunger and hardship, and, well led, would be very good soldiers.

Speaking of their services in "driving the Spaniards from Cavite, twenty odd miles into the defences of Manila," General Whittier said (page 499):

All the success was on the natives' side, and the Spaniards surrendered between 7,000 and 8,000 men well armed, plenty of ammunition, and in good physical condition. The excuse of the latter may be that their enemy was in small bands; but they never captured one of these, and the small bands drove them to their walls.

The most conclusive evidence, however, of a complete understanding of the several military and naval officers of the United States in this matter is to be found in the report of Consul Wildman, which was brought into the debate as follows:

Mr. PIERCE, of Tennessee —

Consul Wildman states, and the records show it, that openly in the Spanish Cortes General Rivera, who was the Spanish Governor-General, stated that of the money that was to be paid only \$400,000 of it, and that in Mexican dollars, was paid, when they had to pay over \$1,000,000; that he did not propose to carry out what was stipulated at the time.

In 1897 Aguinaldo, Agoncillo, and other leaders of the Philippines agreed to leave the island, and that certain civil reforms were to be entered upon, but as Rivera says himself, he did not propose to carry them out, and he did not propose to pay any of the money; and this is what the Consul at Hong Kong says, and I will read what he says, as I do not wish to state it myself. Here is what Consul Wildman says:

#### CONSULATE OF THE UNITED STATES,

HONG KONG, July 18, 1898.

There has been a systematic attempt to blacken the name of Aguinaldo and his cabinet on account of the questionable terms of their surrender to Spanish forces a year ago this month. It has been said that they sold their country for gold; but this has been conclusively disproved, not only by their own statements, but by the speech of the late Governor-General Rivera in the Spanish Senate, June 11, 1898. He said that Aguinaldo undertook to submit if the Spanish government would give a certain sum to the widows and orphans of the insurgents. He then admits that only a tenth part of this sum was ever given to Aguinaldo, and that the other promises made he did not find it expedient to keep.

I was in Hong Kong September, 1897, when Aguinaldo and his leaders arrived under contract with the Spanish Government. They waited until the first of November for the payment of the promised money and the fulfilment of the promised reforms. Only \$400,000, Mexican, was ever placed to their credit in the banks, and on the third of November Mr. F. Agoncillo, late minister of foreign affairs in Aguinaldo's cabinet, called upon me and made a proposal, which I transmitted to the State Department in my despatch No. 19, dated Nov. 3, 1897.

In reply the State Department instructed me "to courteously decline to communicate with the department further regarding the alleged mission." I obeyed these instructions to the letter



until the breaking out of the war, when, after consultation with Admiral Dewey, I received a delegation from the insurgent junta, and they bound themselves to obey all laws of civilized warfare, and to place themselves absolutely under the orders of Admiral Dewey if they were permitted to return to Manila. At this time their president, Aguinaldo, was in Singapore negotiating, through Consul-General Pratt, with Admiral Dewey for his return.

On April 27, in company with Consul O. F. Williams, we received another delegation, composed of Señor Sandico, Jose Maria Basa, Tomas Mascardo, Lorenzo L. Zialeta, Andres E. Garchitorena, Manuel Malvar, Mariano Llanza, Salvatore Estrella. We agreed, on behalf of Dewey, to allow two of their number to accompany the fleet to Manila. Consequently, on the same day, I took in the tug "Fame" Alizandrino and Garchitorena, accompanied by Mr. Sandico, to the "Olympia," in Mir's Bay. On May 2 Aguinaldo arrived in Hong Kong and immediately called on me.

It was May 16th before I could obtain permission from Admiral Dewey to allow Aguinaldo to go by the United States ship "McCulloch," and I put him aboard in the night so as to save any complications with the local government. Immediately on the arrival of Aguinaldo at Cavite he issued a proclamation, which I had outlined for him before he left, forbidding pillage, and making it a criminal offence to maltreat neutrals. He, of course, organized a government of which he was dictator, an absolutely necessary step if he hoped to maintain control over the natives, and from that date until the present time he has been uninterruptedly successful in the field, and dignified and just at the head of his government.

In conclusion, I wish to put myself on record as stating that the insurgent government of the Philippine islands cannot be dealt with as though they were North American Indians, willing to be moved from one reservation to another at the whim of their masters. If the United States decides not to retain the Philippine islands its 10,000,000 people will demand independence, and the attempt of any foreign nation to obtain territory or coaling stations will be resisted with the same spirit with which they fought the Spaniards.

I have the honor, etc.

ROUNSEVELLE WILDMAN,

*Consul-General.*

Mr. PIERCE —

And that money Aguinaldo, as shown by Mr. Williams, Consul of the United States, has turned over to buy arms. He executed a power of attorney and turned it over to him, that he might pay for the arms that had been purchased. I repeat here that the arms came under American control, and were turned over through American officials to Aguinaldo to arm the natives in their fight against the Spaniards, to aid the Americans in the capture of Manila. (Applause.) We have this plain letter. It is not manufactured by me. We see here the same policy pursued by gentlemen on the other side of the House to carry out the policy of Mr. McKinley.

Finally, in support of the right of the Filipinos Mr. Pierce quotes Admiral Dewey in the following terms:

These people, the Filipinos, are far superior in their intelligence and more capable of self-government than the natives of Cuba, and I am familiar with both races.

Closing as follows:

And yet we propose to give a free government to the Island of Cuba, to the natives of Cuba; and George Dewey, a man soon to become an Admiral, a title which he richly merits and deserves, says these natives of the Philippine islands are superior to the natives of Cuba. Congress has said that the natives of Cuba should be free. What the President said to the Filipinos was given to them through their press.

The Filipinos rendered every assistance that they could to aid the United States. They drove the Spaniards into their walled city of Manila, held all the outer lines and fortifications, cut off the supplies, cut off the food and water, and rendered assistance to the American army which would have made it impossible for them without that assistance to have taken the Spanish army, for if it had not been for Aguinaldo's army the Spaniards could have retreated from the city of Manila and beyond the reach of Dewey's guns.

These citations are from the official document prepared in the office of the Secretary of State and submitted to Congress by President William McKinley

with the treaty of peace. It is apparent that the several military and naval officers of the United States acted upon their faith on the declaration of the President when he announced that he did not contemplate "forcible annexation," which by our code of morality he declared would be "criminal aggression."

It, therefore, appears that carefully refraining from any act outside their lawful functions, Commodore Dewey, General Anderson, Consul-General Smith of Singapore, and Consul Wildman of Hong Kong, secured the coöperation of Aguinaldo, promoted his return in a government vessel to Manila, supplied him and his forces with arms taken from the Spaniards, and invited his coöperation in the common undertaking to remove the oppressive rule of Spain from the Philippine islands in order that the people might enjoy liberty. The President of the United States, having knowledge of all these facts, then turns back on his declaration, gives orders without authority of law, under an assumed power, to General Otis to take possession and administer the government of the Philippine islands.

This bald statement of the facts of the case calls for no words. The question before the country now is how to remedy this wrong and how to remove from the Philippine islands the oppression which has been substituted for that of Spain with the least delay and the least humiliation.

At the very time when the foregoing text was being put in type comes the first information yet received by mail of which the public has any knowledge, in regard to the condition of affairs at the time and in the weeks preceding the slaughter of the Filipinos by our army, from a competent observer who was on the spot.

Many rumors have been in circulation, based on private letters in regard to the origin of that attack, but in the following letter of Rev. Clay MacCauley, whose evidence has been cited in the body of this pamphlet, we begin to get evidence from an independent source not like that over the telegraph line under Government censorship:

*[Special Correspondence of the Transcript.]*

TOKYO, JAPAN, February 9.

If it be true, as telegraphed by "Renter" this morning, that "the Washington cabinet has decided on a vigorous offensive attack on Iloilo and on an endeavor to capture the Filipino government of Mololos," then, so it seems to me, the greatest mistake yet made by the present Administration and one of the least justifiable wrongs in American political history have been committed and have brought with them their penalty. It may be, now that the Filipino insurgents have attacked our army and killed some of our soldiers, that there is no way left for our Government but that of offensive war and an attempted conquest of the Philippine islands. But, even under this necessity, I cannot help remembering that had the American Government been generous or wise through the months just passed no assault by a Filipino army would have been made upon the soldiers of the United States, and no such dreadful future as that now probably awaiting these people would have confronted them. Ignorance and reckless aggressiveness in high places in America and too prosaic an obedience, a temperamental fault and mingled timidity and inability in the administrative authorities at Manila, will in time be known as the chief occasions of this terrible calamity. I do not accuse without reasons.

At the first, in May last, the Filipino insurgents were encouraged by the American authorities in their renewed hostility to the Spaniards. They were ready then to give any and full allegiance to the United States. At the downfall of Manila no enthusiasm could be greater from a people than that of the Filipinos for the Americans. What at that time were the supreme directions from Washington? "Have no embarrassing relations with the insurgents; make no compromising promises; be careful that the way

for the United States be clear into the future." Regulations that were doubtless wise and, under the circumstances, imperative. But how were they applied? In the answer to this question lies in largest part the explanation of the struggle just begun. Some evil fate seems to have guided the movement step by step from its insignificant beginnings to its present portentous issues. Clearly the United States authorities had no right in August last or since then, even to to-day, to offer to the eager Filipinos any definite policy for the direction of their mutual relations. But, clearly, too, these authorities had not only right, but they were in duty bound not to let the Filipinos misunderstand them or their country during the critical progress of events. Under the circumstances mutual confidence, sympathy, and patience were imperative. It was above all needed that the representatives in Manila of the United States Government should go to these people, just emancipated from Spanish rule, and with kind sympathy tell them until they understood the facts without doubt that, more than anything else, both peoples must wait for the law's delays, for a treaty of peace, for ratification of the treaty, and then for a definite policy that should direct them in the future. In a way these things were known by and made known to the Filipinos. But that was not enough. So fearful were the American authorities that the future might be embarrassed by their words or acts that very soon after the capture of Manila not only had official intercourse with the insurgent leaders become almost nil, and what there was of it almost wholly mandatory on the part of the Americans, but the social intercourse also that had begun in the most cordial ways was rapidly lessened and constrained. Then, it is true that so far as movements were made by the Americans either in America or the Philippines appearances more and more indicated that the United States Government was more and more tending to assume the sovereignty of the islands. Whether this assumption was to be for a protectorate or for incorporation of the Philippines into the American body politic was not evident, and no one responsible for his opinions offered to talk the matter over with the leaders of the Philippine republic, then coming into life.

Through the summer and the early autumn the Filipino leaders were not averse to annexation to the United States. Indeed, I am under the impression that they at the first looked for and wished for union with the American republic. And though I am not in favor of the annexation of these far-away lands to the United States, I am confident that until towards the close of the year any politic representative of our government at Manila could have enrolled Aguinaldo and his friends among the most ardent supporters of the proposed annexation. Our whole attitude and action, however, seemed determined towards alienation and not friendship. The Filipino leaders were, from almost the first, repelled and ignored. Hardly could men have set about in a better way to arouse resentment, suspicion, anger, and rebellion than the men in charge of the administration of American interests in Manila.

The Filipinos were made to feel that Americans considered them not worth either political or social consideration. Driven back upon themselves, their soldiers treated with contempt, their wishes not listened to or respected, if heard, told nothing of our Government's ultimate desires or purposes, or, if told, left without judicious, sympathetic explanations of the course of events in Washington, — the Filipinos gradually accepted their isolation, organized their government more and more thoroughly, and began to import arms and ammunition for their own support and defence. I cannot blame them for having done this. They could so easily have been retained as our allies and friends. A sympathizer, a conciliator, a politician, in the good sense of the word, could have kept them with him step by step, while the administration at Washington was coming to a consciousness of its own wishes and aims. But we let them go; we let them misunderstand us, or we did not try to keep them with us as we came to understand ourselves better. On our own authorities, not on the Filipinos, falls the blame that the Filipinos changed from friends to enemies, and at last turned towards us in the trenches at Manila a hostile front. A more lamentable series of lost opportunities, of neglected openings for having one's own way, of deliberate manufacture of enemies, it would be difficult to find in the history of nations. I am not alone in this judgment. Could impartial observers from among foreigners, long resident in Manila, be heard,

dared intelligent American officers and soldiers at Manila speak, could Aguinaldo and his friends be believed, my charge would not stand without ample support.

Our own Government and the administrative authorities at Manila who acted for the home Government, both in ignorance and with recklessness, cast aside again and again the very agencies that would have brought about the end that the annexationists have most sought. Through the mistake of not having had the right men in the responsible places, and through the excessive caution attending a policy in the process of formation at Washington, the Americans have lost the allegiance and incurred the hostility of a whole people. The Filipinos once idealized the United States. They were ready to do our bidding to the utmost, had we but used the wands of sympathy and confidence. And now here we are at bayonet points, and the American Government has decided to attempt the "capture of the Filipinos' government at Malolos." It will be doubtless the policy of the imperialist press now to tell the American people that the Filipinos are false to their promises of last year; are treacherous; not fit for self-government and should be suppressed, and that this war should be carried to its deadly end. Very well! Let all the charges of this kind be true, the fact yet remains that our own bungling rule in Manila has impelled them to treachery and rebellion. But the pity of it, when another record was so easy to make! Had a man of the President's own temperament been in command at Manila, notwithstanding the caution of the uncertain yet aggressive Washington Administration, the new year, I feel sure, would have opened with the "Filipino Republic," anxious to be made an integral part of the great republic of the West.

Were nations amenable to repentance and reform, something might yet be done to remedy this great mistake and wrong. But history, I fear, justifies no hope for such change. Rather does the present calamity, if this morning's telegram tells the truth, tempt one to say: Let us as a nation let all pretence at philanthropy and national justice go. Let us admit that the Anglo-Saxon in America as well as in Europe is a ravening beast still. He fought for liberty and independence a hundred years ago, but he fought not for the "glittering generalities" of the Declaration of Independence, — the principle of human freedom, — but for his own life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. Shall this new war in the Philippines be proclaimed a war of righteousness, a war for the sake of humanity? No! it is the penalty of our own incompetence and folly. I would not if I could, make the Philippines a part of the United States. Sooner or later out of such union would come resentment, revenge, and rebellion, even could it have been brought about in peace and of good will. But now, to make of this people our conquered subjects when they might at least have been made friendly fellow-citizens, what shame to America, what a penalty to pay for ignorance and impotence!

CLAY MACCAULEY.

With this, the case as it now stands is submitted to the people of this country.

The first edition of my treatise on *The Cost of a National Crime and The Hell of War* was dedicated to the President of the United States, in the hope that he would meet the responsibility so as to justify the quotation from Milton:

"Oh, yet a nobler task awaits thy hand  
(For what can war but endless war still breed?)  
Till truth and right from violence be freed,  
And public faith clear'd from the shameful brand  
Of public fraud!"

The President has failed. It now remains for every citizen to demand that our public faith shall be cleared from the shameful brand of public fraud.

EDWARD ATKINSON.







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